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Abstract: This work is devoted to the problem of the 
criterion of metaphorical statements. In order to 
categorise the statements as particular type (literal, 
metaphorical, idiom, …) we need a definite criterion. 
As one possible solution to this problem it is 
suggested to take logical criterion based on the 
obvious contradiction to the third axiom of logic (the 
law of excluded middle). In the article the experiment 
conducted to check the proposed criterion is 
described and the results of the experiment are 
presented. 
 




One of the main directions of AI research is 
natural language understanding. Usually the 
specialists in the field consider only non-figurative 
language leaving figurative language aside. At the 
same time non-figurative speech and, in particular, 
metaphors have received a special attention in 
psycholinguistic studies recently.  
If we accept the idea that speech could be divided 
into literal and figurative we divide linguistic 
behaviour into two types. Therefore, we will face the 
problem what makes us to choose this or that type of 
behaviour and what serves us as the criterion that 
helps to choose this or that interpretation of utterance. 
Second problem is closely connected with the 
criterion of metaphoricity.  
Such a criterion should help a person to decide 
whether she/he deals with a metaphorical or literal 
proposition. In other words, we have to explain how a 
human being in her/his psychological reality could 
differentiate different linguistic expressions. The 
answer to this problem is crucial for any theory of 
language or theory of metaphor as well as for AI 
applications.  
Different answers are based on different models. 
The first model sees metaphor as a comparison (e.g., 
Tomashevsky, 1998; Vinogradov, 1976).   
Second model tries to explain metaphor from the 
pragmatic point of view. Within this theory we could 
explain metaphor as certain violation of rules that 
guide use of language (e.g., Searle; 1979, Grice, 
1975). In this case we use words to convey sense that 
is different from the words' sense, i.e. metaphorical 
meaning is different from the words' meaning, 
contrary to the literal proposition. If we find the set of 
rules that guide our language practice (Grice, 1975) 
then metaphor could be explained as violation of 
certain rule(s).  
The third model sees in metaphor semantic 
phenomenon, i.e. explains it as a proposition that 
violates semantic structures of language. Such solution 
allows to ignore non-linguistic (e.g., pragmatic) 
factors and to explain metaphor only within semantic 
structure of a word. Usually theories of that type 
explain metaphor as the transfer of a certain features 
(but not defining) of a concept a word stands for 
(Ortony, 1979; Arutunova, 1979; Lakoff&Johnson, 
1980). 
Notwithstanding the fact that we break the 
majority of theories of metaphor in a three big groups 
on the basis of underlying model the criterion which 
breaks linguistic construction on metaphorical and 
literal sentences is in the most cases logical: 
 
We take as metaphor an expression  
that is obviously false or meaningless.                (1) 
 
When taking literally metaphor in most cases is 










only evidence for such a criterion. Slightly different 
version of this criterion we could find in different 
works (Arutunova, 1979; Vinogradov, 1976; Searle, 
1979, etc.). However, there are several difficulties 
with such a criterion. We could easily see that 
propositions such as "John is a jackal'" are obviously 
false. That is why we could treat such propositions as 
metaphors. However, equally easy we could see that 
propositions such as "The Earth is flat", "The Sun is a 
small object" are also obviously false. At the same 
time they are not metaphors. The main problem with 
this criterion is that it requires considering as a 
metaphor any false expression. Otherwise we have to 
add extra rule(s) that would filter out "good" false 
expressions (potential metaphors) from "bad" false 
expressions (simply false expressions). From the one 
prospect the rule (1) gives us rather necessary 
condition than a criterion (necessary and sufficient 
condition), i.e. a metaphor is false when taken literally 
but this very fact is not sufficient for consideration an 
expression as metaphor. We think that such a criterion 
should be extended. 
Let us consider the following construction: 
 
All living beings are mortal. 
All birds are living beings. 
Dove is a bird.             (2) 
Dove is mortal. 
 
If we agree with all the premises and with the 
process of reasoning we should except the conclusion.  
Now let us change the initial construction in the 
following way: 
 
All living beings are mortal. 
All birds are living beings.                         (3) 
My soul is a bird flying in the sky 
My soul is mortal. 
 
Now the conclusion seems to be wrong, even if 
we would except the premises. What has happened 
with the example? We changed one of the 
propositions for a metaphor. If we would follow 
comparison or semantic theories of metaphor we will 
face real difficulties to explain why the conclusion in 
(3) is wrong, since we have to accept that the 
comparison is true or at least that it is meaningful. 
If we accept one of the pragmatic theories of 
metaphor then we have to change metaphorical 
premises in (3) for another proposition that conveys 
[true] metaphorical meaning. 
The third possibility is to suggest that 
metaphorical expressions are not subjected to formal 
logic (i.e., contradict to one or several axioms of 
formal logic). We think that this property of metaphor 
rather than its obvious falsehood could be taken as the 
criterion for metaphoricity. In the simplest form we 
could think about criterion for metaphor as about the 
rule that could show that an expression in question 
does not belong to the set of expressions subjected to 
formal logic. As such a rule we could formulate a 
criterion based on obvious violation of the third axiom 
of formal logic (the law of excluded middle): 
 
If the proposition conveyed by linguistic 
expression is obviously false, but it is 
said (or it is evident from the context) 
that it is true, we have a sign that we  
deal with metaphor.                                       (4) 
 
The criterion (4) could be considered as necessary 
and sufficient criterion for metaphor. In other words, 
when we say, "John is a jackal," we mean just what we 
say, i.e., that John is a jackal and we will insist that 
John is a jackal notwithstanding the fact that the 
proposition is wrong. It means that we will not agree 
that we are wrong that John is a jackal. Such a 
criterion tells us that if we give some cue that plainly 
wrong or meaningless expression is true it could be 
taken as a metaphor. Similarly metaphor could be 
considered as ordinary false propositions if it would 
be said that they have to be considered within formal 
logic.  




The idea of the experiment is check how the 
perception of metaphors changes under different 
conditions. According to our line of reasoning the 
explicit order to use the rules of formal logic should 
prevent to perceive metaphors as true statements. 
However, if the circumstances change (e.g., there is no 
necessity to use logical rules) metaphors could be 
considered as the statements telling the truth being 
actually false. It is assumed that in most situations 
people should not judge metaphors as false 
statements, i.e., they should differentiate between false 
statements and metaphors.  
We expect also that explicit instruction to use, for 
example, mental imagery or logic rules should change 
the perception of metaphors. The instruction to use 
logical rules would result in the increased perception 
of metaphors as false statements, whereas the 
instruction to use mental imagery would result in the 
increased perception of metaphors as true statements.  
To check these predictions the following 
experiment was done. 
Method 
Participants 
The participants were 90 students from Belarusan 










and Belarusan State University of Informatics and 
Padioelectronics: 45 males and 45 females. The age of 
participants vary from 17 to 31. They took part in the 
experiment as volunteers.  
Materials 
A list of 60 sentences was prepared for the 
experiment. The sentences in the list were of 3 types. 
Twenty sentences were obviously false (e.g., "The 
Earth is flat", "A triangle has four angles"), twenty 
sentences were true (e.g., "A triangle has three 
angles"), and the last twenty were metaphors taken 
from poetic and scientific literature. Several random 
sequences of chosen sentences were prepared 
Three types of instruction were also prepared. 
One instruction was neutral and told the subjects that 
their task is to determine whether each of the 
sentences in the list is true or false. The second 
instruction stated explicitly that to solve the task it is 
necessary to use formal logic. The third instruction 
contained the order to use mental imagery when 
evaluating sentences as true or false.  
Procedure 
The subjects were divided into three groups (15 
males and 15 females). Each group received a booklet 
of 4 pages with one of the instructions on the first 
page. The last three pages contained the list of 
sentences. Near each sentence the words "YES" and 
"NO" were printed, and the subjects were to circle the 
answer they choose.  
The participants were tested individually or in 
small groups. They were given unlimited time to 
complete the task. It took approximately 10 minutes to 
do it. 
Results and discussion  
For the statistical analysis the number of positive 
answers (the answer "YES") was taken. Positive 
answers for three different types of instruction and 
three different kinds of statements were counted.  
The data of two subjects were excluded from the 
analysis because of possible unreliability: too many 
positive answers to the obviously false statements. 
Two-way ANOVA was performed with the 
obtained data where one factor was the instruction's 
type and the other factor was the kind of sentence. For 
the data analysis STATISTICA 5.5 for Windows was 
used. 
The main effect of the variable kind of sentence 


















































Tukey HSD Post Hoc test showed that there is 
also statistically significant difference between the 
perception of metaphors and true sentences as 
correct ones (p<0,0001) as well as between the 
perception of metaphors and false sentences 
(p<0,0001). It is evident from the data that unlike 
the other statements metaphors could be seen as true 
or false depending on the subject's attitude or 
experience. The qualitative analysis of the data 
showed that one and the same metaphor was 
considered as true by one participant but appeared 
to be false for another participant. 
The interaction between the type of instruction 
(formal logic vs. mental imagery) and kind of 
sentences (true sentences or metaphors) appeared to 
be statistically significant (F(1,112)=4,82; p<0,03). 



















Fig.2. Interaction between the type of instruction and kind of statements:  
mean number of positive answers for metaphors and literally true statements in two different conditions 
(to use formal logic and to use mental imagery) 
 
 
It could be noted that the changes in the 
instruction did not influence the number of literally 
true statements perceived as true (Duncan Post Hoc 
test, р=0,51), but significantly changed the number of 
metaphorical statements perceived as true (Duncan 
Post Hoc test, р<0,02). The requirement to use formal 
logic reduced the number of metaphors that could be 
counted as correct statements. 
 
3. CONCLUSION 
From the results of the experiment it is evident 
that in normal situation people do not judge metaphors 
as false statements. Explicit instruction to use formal 
logic or mental imagery changes the perception of 
metaphors. They are perceived as truths more often 
under the condition to use mental imagery then under 
the condition to use formal logic rules, i.e., we 
obtained the predicted results. This shows us that the 
suggested criterion could be considered as possible 
solution to the problem of differentiation between 
figurative and non-figurative speech. 
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